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ABSTRACT 
SARA BUSH: Commemorating the Nanchang Uprising: How the Chinese Communist Party 
Legitimized Its Use of Force, 1933-1953 
(Under the direction of Michael Tsin) 
 
 
Drawing upon theoretical concepts from the field of memory studies, this thesis 
argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders emphasized doctrinal priorities, 
mobilized troops, and legitimized their use of military force in part through annual 
commemoration of the August 1, 1927 Nanchang uprising, which they declared to be the 
founding event for the armies that became the PRC’s armed forces.  Tracing the evolution of 
the Nanchang uprising narrative between 1933, when CCP leaders first officially 
commemorated the event, and 1953, when Chinese involvement in the Korean War 
concluded, reveals new insight about how the Communist leaders used collective memory to 
recruit support for its continued use of military force, even as strategic priorities evolved.  
Official party documents and party-authored editorial articles directed at the public from 
1933 to 1953 suggest that party members constructed a commemorative narrative about the 
1927 uprising that they saw as legitimizing the party’s military actions.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, historians and 
political scientists have been addressing one of the most persistent questions about twentieth-
century China: how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was able to come to power and 
consolidate political authority over the Chinese state.  The earliest studies by Western 
scholars to explore this issue, produced in the shadow of the Cold War and constrained by a 
lack of access to historical sources, were often narrowly focused on either the political 
struggles of Chinese Communist leaders or on specific policies for social mobilization that 
Communist leaders enacted.1  Despite their limited scope, these studies raised several valid 
explanations for the CCP’s ability to attract support that have had lasting influence on 
subsequent scholarship.  For example, Benjamin Schwartz and Stuart Schram argued that the 
CCP’s success was a result of the charismatic leadership of Mao Zedong; Chalmers Johnson 
emphasized the CCP’s ability to rally people on the basis of a shared interest in Chinese 
 
1. The anti-communist intellectual atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s was in many cases discouraging to 
scholars attempting to pursue studies that could be perceived to portray Chinese Communism in a positive or 
complimentary manner, which complicated initial efforts at objective study of CCP ideology, goals, and 
intentions. On the other hand, the foreign policy interests and anti-communist agenda of the United States 
government and, to some extent, Western European leaders in this period probably encouraged the study of 
contemporary Chinese politics as a means of contextualizing and advancing anti-communist foreign policy 
goals.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnamese Communist revolution and American experience fighting in 
Vietnam urged scholars such as Chalmers Johnson and Mark Selden to question the role of the Chinese 
population in the Communist revolution, but their studies still exhibit a “top-down” approach characteristic of 
Cold War-era studies. For further on the sources and effects of politicization on Cold War-era studies of the 
early PRC as well as the changes in the past two decades that have increased scholarly interest in early PRC 
history, see Julia Strauss, “Introduction: In Search of PRC History,” The China Quarterly 188 (December 
2006), 856-7. 
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nationalism; and Mark Selden concluded that the CCP relied on popular policies, especially 
land reform and redistribution, to win over the loyalty of the Chinese population.2  The 
broadest conclusions of these scholars have gained wide acceptance, but from today’s 
perspective these classic studies are ultimately unsatisfying.  They appear both outdated and 
parochial in their strict political focus.  Simply identifying key characteristics in CCP elite 
politics and influential Communist policies is not enough to adequately account for the 
evolutionary process by which the CCP transformed from a small, unarmed group of Chinese 
intellectuals in the 1920s to the leaders of a professionalized military revolution by the 1940s 
that established them as China’s top political authority by the 1950s.3  
Recognizing a need to expand and update the original studies of the Chinese 
Communist revolution, scholars in the post Cold War period have taken a greater interest in 
studying the political activity and opinions of Chinese people who were not part of the CCP 
elite—in other words, those who were the subjects of CCP political initiatives.  Historians 
and political scientists since the 1990s have begun to take advantage of gradually increasing 
access to sources in China to produce studies that are more detailed, multidimensional, and 
complex than the classic scholarship of the Cold War era.  For example, relying on access to 
a variety of regional and municipal CCP archives, Odoric Wou argued that understanding 
China’s Communist revolution requires not only consideration of elite politics, but also the 
careful analysis of the effects of CCP mobilization policies on the Chinese people, which 
 
2.  Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1951); Stuart R Schram, Mao Tse-tung, [Reprinted with revisions]. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1967); 
Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971). 
3 For purposes of this study, in the context of CCP history, the term elite refers collectively to the party’s 
founders, leaders, and those members serving in influential positions within the party’s central decisionmaking 
bodies such as the CCP Central Committee. 
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eventually brought about a social revolution.4  Similarly, Elizabeth Perry analyzed the 
collective political action of Chinese workers and militia members in Shanghai, using access 
to party archives in Shanghai to demonstrate that average Chinese workers had a much 
greater role as agents of revolution than Cold War-era studies had indicated, whether or not 
they were responding to the CCP’s organizational and mobilization efforts.5  Ralph Thaxton 
drew similar conclusions about the political agency of Chinese individuals in rural areas 
suggesting that the Communist agenda appealed to rural people because they perceived the 
CCP as an ally in their long-standing grievances with China’s central government over 
commercial regulation and taxes.6  These and other recent studies have effectively 
established that the rise of the CCP required the recruitment and participation of average 
individuals.  By attempting to interpret the popular reception of the CCP’s mobilization 
efforts, recent studies have significantly expanded the scope of scholarship beyond the 
narrow political focus of the Cold War era.  
However, even with greater exploration of relevant social factors influencing the 
CCP’s status, recent scholarship continues to focus too narrowly on the most traditional 
indicators of political power and state-society relationships, such as policy implementation 
and the control of administrative institutions, which alone cannot explain how the CCP 
legitimized its claim on political authority.7  The Chinese Communists had to define for 
 
4. Odoric Y. K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses : Building Revolution in Henan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press,, 1994), 1-19. 
5. Elizabeth J Perry, Shanghai on Strike : the Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1993); Elizabeth J Perry, Patrolling the Revolution : Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern 
Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006). 
6. Ralph Thaxton, Salt of the Earth : The Political Origins of Peasant Protest and Communist Revolution in 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press,, 1997). 
7. Scholars typically look for indicators of the state-society relationship or political efficacy of actors like the 
CCP in documents that reveal policy implementation and administrative changes such as police, court, and 


themselves and for their constituents a basis for their legitimate right to political authority, 
drawing a crucial link between the ideological goals of the party elites and their real 
interactions with the Chinese people they were attempting to mobilize.  Establishing political 
legitimacy was a dynamic process for the CCP that evolved over a period of decades and was 
intertwined with strategic behavior and the use of military force.  The next step toward a 
deeper understanding of how the CCP acquired the political legitimacy necessary to lead its 
revolution can benefit from methodological insights that have emerged from the work of 
cultural historians, and especially those who have studied collective memory.8  The 
interdisciplinary methods for research in the humanities employed by many cultural 
historians to analyze narrative and rhetoric can help reveal the processes by which the CCP 
justified its political authority.    
Party-sanctioned narratives of turning points in party history play a particularly 
important role in galvanizing party ideology and mobilizing the public because they establish 
collective memories of shared experiences that legitimize the party.  Moreover, narratives 
embedded within official proclamations of the party record the evolutionary process by 
which Communist leaders attempted to appeal to the public.  The historical evidence for this 
claim can be found woven throughout the party’s official documentary record, but this essay 
    
militia records, documentation of land redistribution, and records of disbursement of social welfare benefits as 
well as preserved correspondence between individuals and government officials about these issues. 
8. In referring to methodological insights that have emerged from the work of cultural historians, I am invoking 
those interdisciplinary methods for historical scholarship that have become broadly associated with responses to 
the so-called “Cultural Turn.” The theoretical approach of this essay bears significant influence of the following 
sources, among others: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991); Robert F. Berkhofer, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and 
Discourse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Calder, Angus, The Myth of the Blitz (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1991); Frederick Corney, Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the 
East Asian Modern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the 
Production of History (Boston: Beacon, 1995); Rubie Watson, ed., Memory, History, and Opposition Under 
State Socialism (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1994). 

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will focus on one of the most important examples: the evolution of the CCP’s narrative to 
commemorate the Nanchang uprising.   
The Nanchang uprising occurred August 1, 1927, and it has been celebrated since at 
least 1933 as the founding event of the party’s armed forces.9  At the most basic level, 
commemoration of the uprising has served to venerate the actions of CCP members who 
turned against the army of the Nationalists in which they had been serving and led several 
regiments of troops to occupy the city of Nanchang in China’s eastern province of Jiangxi, 
hoping to trigger a broader backlash.  The revolt failed to meet its intended tactical purposes, 
but the CCP has nonetheless continued to showcase narratives of the event in its official 
party and military history up to the present, using it as a means to build leadership cohesion, 
party-army cooperation, and public support for the military. 
As the evolution of the Nanchang uprising narrative demonstrates, in terms of the 
party’s ability to mobilize support, one of the most critical characteristics of the CCP before 
and after 1949 is its attitude toward the use of force.  As a non-state actor for its first several 
decades, the CCP faced a formidable task of justifying its right to wield military force.  
Deeply influenced by the core principles of Marxist-Leninism, the CCP defined its role as the 
leaders of a people’s revolution that integrated political ideology, military action, and 
empowering Chinese people to oppose all forms of oppression and imperialism.10  This 
 
9. For full Chinese text of documents announcing the commemoration of Army Day in 1933, see??? : ?
???? ?  [Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang Uprising: Collected 
Memorials of the Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], (Chinese Communist Party History Press, 1987), 169-70. These 
documents will be analyzed in greater detail later in this article. 
10. It bears recognition here that the principles of Marxist-Leninism also deeply influenced the ideological 
development of the CCP’s primary opponents: the Nationalist Party.  Both parties emerged from a new Chinese 
political tradition that claimed Sun Yatsen as a founder and absorbed organizational and ideological advice and 
training from the Communist International (Comintern) and Soviet government.  Though this paper will focus 
on the ways that the CCP deliberately distinguished itself from the Nationalists, it does not intend to de-
emphasize the numerous similarities the parties exhibited throughout the early twentieth century. 


attitude has had profound implications for the evolution of the CCP’s strategic culture and 
relationship with its supporters.  Starting in the late 1920s CCP leaders legitimized their use 
of force and distinguished themselves from their primary opponents by blurring the 
boundaries between party, military, and people in both their ideology and rhetoric—themes 
which appear prominently when the CCP invokes the collective memory of the Nanchang 
uprising that it has fostered.  
Examples of the CCP’s references to the Nanchang uprising in official declarations 
and statements document the Party’s attempts to conceptualize its use of force through a 
series of changing narratives, and how that process of narrativization itself in turn served a 
legitimizing function in party ideology and rhetoric.  In other words, party declarations about 
the Nanchang uprising were not simply propaganda or artifacts external to the political 
process; in fact, drafting and reproducing the documents was an essential step in the political 
process itself, solidifying party values among leaders and constituents alike.  Despite their 
failure to meet their military objectives in the Nanchang uprising, CCP leaders gleaned 
important lessons from the experience about the necessity of appealing to ordinary Chinese 
people for support of and participation in their military activities.  Thus in narratives 
commemorating the Nanchang uprising, CCP leaders specified a closely integrated 
relationship between party, military, and people that justified their party’s use of military 
force.  
By the time the PRC was established in 1949, the close relationship of the CCP and 
its military—in which each military officer was shadowed by a party counterpart and most 
military officers simultaneously held high party ranks—had become a defining characteristic 

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of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and PRC strategic culture.11  In short, in the process 
of memorializing the Nanchang uprising story in official declarations, the CCP leadership 
began not only to communicate their justification for the use of force but also to internalize 
the relationships that the commemorative narrative symbolized as a cause of their 
revolutionary success.


 
11. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the term used by the CCP to refer to its armed forces since 1949.  
Between 1927 and 1949, and to a certain extent, between 1950 and 1953, CCP military forces went by a variety 
of different names.  Today’s CCP traces the origin of the army it calls PLA to the 1927 Nanchang Uprising, but 
this path of origin is not as linear as CCP ideological history makes it appear. This essay will attempt to use 
historically specific army names when possible or will refer to the armies in general as “the CCP’s military 
forces.”   

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CHAPTER 2 
SUMMONING COLLECTIVE MEMORY TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
In order to understand how early CCP leaders met their natural obligation to justify 
their use of military force to themselves and their constituents, this study bases its approach 
on the premise that Communist party leaders often use historical narratives to legitimize their 
ideologies, policies, and plans.  The behavior is not specific to the Chinese Communists, who 
modeled their ideology and rhetoric on the Bolsheviks and that party’s principles of 
democratic centralism.  Communist party historical narratives represent negotiated versions 
of significant past events that party elites have accepted as aligned with their desired political 
image and supportive of their planned future for their party.  Historians such as Frederick 
Corney, Susan Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, and Felix Wemheuer have each applied theoretical 
principles from landmark research in the field of memory studies in order to better explain 
what official Communist historiography can and cannot reveal about the intentions of past 
Communist leaders in Russia and China.  The work of these scholars argues for the 
reexamination of official CCP documents and long published writings by early CCP leaders. 
In light of their theses about the role of historical narrative in validating the political goals of 
Communist parties, the Nanchang uprising emerges as an example of how CCP leaders 
negotiated, projected, and internalized their strategic priorities leading up to and immediately 
after the founding of the PRC. 
In his book, Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution, 
Frederick Corney uses principles drawn from studies of collective memory to demonstrate

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that the Bolshevik founding narrative was not a simple description of events that happened, 
which could have been interpreted in a variety of ways, but rather an argument for a single 
interpretation of events that served a political purpose.12  Influenced by concepts from 
memory studies, Corney demonstrates that understanding the process by which Bolshevik 
leaders in Russia developed their version of the October Revolution story can reveal 
important new insight about their values, priorities, and fears.  Using examples from 1917 
through the early 1920s, Corney shows how the process of developing the October revolution 
narrative involved a competition of opposing political values.  However, once consensus was 
reached, the outcome produced a story of the party’s foundation that ultimately legitimized 
its leadership authority.  Corney also emphasizes that although the process of narrative 
development was a conscious effort, the result was successful only to the degree to which 
individuals involved in the process of telling it, both within the party elite and general public, 
could locate themselves in it or, in other words, see it as their own story.  According to 
Corney, “Foundation myths derive their most enduring power from the processes of their 
telling.”13 Corney’s findings suggest that the process of constructing and repeating the 
October Revolution narrative played a key role in distilling and articulating the party’s core 
values for both its public audience and the party leaders themselves.   
Important differences distinguish the CCP’s commemoration of the Nanchang 
uprising from the Bolsheviks’ narrative of the October Revolution.  First, the CCP did not 
develop the Nanchang uprising narrative to consolidate their political power and set the tone 
for authority to lead the state, as Corney argues the Bolsheviks did.  For the first two decades 
that the CCP developed and reproduced the Nanchang uprising narrative, the party did not 
 
12. Frederick C Corney, Telling October : Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 8. 
13.  Ibid., 4. 

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command a state.  Instead, the narrative was initially used for motivating and mobilizing 
forces and for establishing the ideological bona fides of maintaining a militarized political 
movement under a Communist banner.  It was only in the late 1940s and early 1950s, after 
the Nanchang story had helped establish an ideological foundation for the CCP’s legitimate 
use of force within the party itself that the leadership began to call upon the narrative to 
support its new role as leaders of the PRC.  Second, Corney depicts contestation over the 
collective memory of the October Revolution that simply does not exist in the Nanchang 
uprising example.  Several competing political parties were involved in the October 
Revolution, and Corney shows how, in some ways, each of the parties had a claim on 
political legitimacy which the Bolsheviks were challenging.  The Nanchang uprising, on the 
other hand, did not hold the nearly same significance for the Nationalists—the CCP’s 
opponents in the event—as it did for the Communist leadership. Because the Nanchang 
uprising involved relatively few individuals and presented relatively little tactical threat to 
the Nationalists in 1927, Nationalist leaders easily dismissed it.14  Moreover, because the 
uprising assumed much greater significance for the Communists in retrospect than it had at 
the time, the CCP’s narrative of it proved to be slightly more malleable than Bolshevik 
versions of the October Revolution story. 
Though these differences exist between the Bolshevik and CCP narratives, the 
variation should not overshadow the relevance of Corney’s thesis and conclusions to the 
study of the CCP’s development of a Nanchang uprising narrative that legitimized its unique 
integrated approach to its military.  The CCP leaders operated on many of the same 
ideological principles as the Bolsheviks and were influenced by the guidance of Bolshevik 
 
14. For a thorough explanation of Nationalist attitudes toward Communist insurgency in 1927, see “The 
Communists Turn to Rebellion (Chapter 6) of C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-
1928 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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advisors throughout the period discussed in this essay. CCP leaders’ commitment to the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism modeled by the Bolsheviks led 
them to pursue many of the same uses for historical narratives as their Soviet counterparts 
when developing their rhetoric.  In a process very similar to the one Corney describes, the 
narrative that the CCP leaders produced evolved into a core part of the Communist army’s 
collective memory and strategic identity that persists to this day. 
Corney’s argument for the relevance of memory studies to understanding the 
historical role of political rhetoric in Communist systems parallels the key conclusions of two 
historians who focus on twentieth-century Chinese history, Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 
and Felix Wemheuer.  Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Wemheuer separately argue for a 
correlation between the CCP’s historical narratives and the party’s efforts to establish and 
maintain political legitimacy.  According to Wemheuer, party history in Communist China 
“is treated as the shared knowledge of the elite and plays an important role at all levels of the 
examination system as well as for entry into the CCP.”15  The work of both of these scholars 
suggests that a re-examination of early CCP historical narratives such as that of the 
Nanchang uprising can illuminate how the CCP deployed historical narratives to mobilize 
support and consolidate its political power. 
Underscoring the potential significance of the results of the CCP’s efforts to control 
collective memory, Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Wemheuer each analyze some of the CCP 
narratives that continue to create the most contestation in state-society relationships—the 
Cultural Revolution and the mass starvation caused by Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, 
respectively.  In a recent article, Weigelin-Schwiedrzik argues that one result of traumatic 
 
15. Felix Wemheuer, “Regime Changes of Memory: Creating the Official History of the Ukranian and Chinese 
Famines under State Socialism and after the Cold War,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 
10, no. 1 (Winter): 34-5. 
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events such as the Cultural Revolution has been an erosion of the CCP’s political legitimacy 
because the personal experiences of people involved presented such a challenging contrast to 
the party’s master narrative. 16  She contends that the party has long used self-manufactured 
narratives of historical events that do not rely strictly on factual accuracy in order to shape 
collective memory in support of its ideological agenda.  When the party’s master narrative is 
effective, it boosts the CCP’s authority and legitimacy.  This approach to narrative can 
backfire, however, in cases such as the Cultural Revolution where the personal memories of 
individuals sharply contradict the party’s master narrative.  Drawing a firm distinction 
between the party’s master narrative and the lived personal memories of Chinese individuals 
based on research from the field of memory studies helps Weigelin-Schwiedrzik deconstruct 
some of the discursive tension surrounding particularly traumatic mass social events. 
Although the story of the origins of the CCP’s armed forces incited far less contestation than 
the traumatic periods in PRC history that Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Wemheuer study, the 
way that those scholars have conceptualized the political function of collective memory in 
Communist China is useful for historicizing the development of the CCP’s justification for 
the use of force through the production and repetition of the Nanchang uprising story.  
The conclusions of Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Wemheuer make plausible the claim of 
this essay that, similar to the case of the Bolsheviks and the October Revolution as Corney 
describes them, the CCP relied on its version of the Nanchang uprising story to justify its use 
of military force, and, in the process, reinforced the emphasis the story placed on integrated, 
cooperative party-army relations as a crucial characteristic of the CCP’s distinctive political 
identity.  In order to interpret the events of the uprising in a way that highlighted the meaning 
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16. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History,” The 
China Quarterly 188 (December 2006): 1072. 
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they sought to transmit, CCP leaders have selectively omitted facts, including some that CCP 
members themselves initially reported and documented.  The CCP encouraged a collective 
memory of the Nanchang uprising intended to draw attention to the party’s priorities and to 
support the party’s political legitimacy.  However, unlike events such as the Cultural 
Revolution and Great Leap Forward, the Nanchang uprising was not a traumatic historical 
experience for most of the Chinese population. In fact, a very small number of people were 
involved, which has meant personal memories presented little challenge to the CCP version.  
Moreover, since the Nationalists viewed the Nanchang uprising as a relatively unimportant 
and unsuccessful event, they did not produce a powerful counternarrative.  Having described 
how and why the CCP relies on historical narratives to legitimize itself, the remainder of this 
paper will trace the evolution of the Nanchang uprising narrative by first providing historical 
context on the uprising itself and then by analyzing representative examples to demonstrate 
the role of this specific narrative in shaping the CCP’s deeply-rooted strategic identity. 
 
A Few Words About Sources 
Because this essay tracks the way the CCP has characterized its relationship with its 
military forces in its narrative of a particular historical event over a period of two decades, 
the most useful sources are documents produced by party leaders, including those intended 
for intraparty communication and those meant to represent the voice of the party to the public.  
Three categories of relevant published documents are widely available: official resolutions of 
the party leadership, articles meant to inform party members or the Chinese public about 
party ideology that were published in CCP-controlled periodicals, and essays or memoirs of 
senior CCP leaders (both essays contemporaneous to events and retrospective memoirs are 
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available in several cases).  Modeled on the Leninist style, the Chinese Communist Party has 
relied throughout its history on a consensus-based approach to leadership among its highest 
echelon of political and military leaders.  The top level of leaders participate in meetings, 
both regularized and informal, but rarely public.  Any debates that occur among these leaders 
tend to take place behind closed doors, and when a consensus is reached, the party typically 
documents the results in the form of official resolutions and directives.  Many such 
documents are made public at the time of their release and others gradually become available 
for historians years or decades after their initial distribution.  Anthologies of published 
official party documents have lined the shelves of academic libraries for years, including 
some in English translation.17  Though some scholars have previously discounted these 
sources as party propaganda, the documents are extremely useful for tracking the evolution 
of CCP historical narratives and for understanding the role of this unique form of political 
rhetoric in the institutional history of the PRC.  It is worth mentioning, however, that the 
documents do not explicitly indicate how the CCP’s decisions were received by the public.  
This essay is focused on how the CCP used its interpretation of historical events in the 
development of its strategic culture; the effectiveness of these messages on the broader 
Chinese public is an interesting question that would require extensive research beyond the 
scope of this project. 
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17. For a good example of a recent comprehensive anthology of translated and annotated CCP documents see 
Tony Saich, ed. The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis, (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1996).  
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CHAPTER 3 
LESSONS LEARNED:  
BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY 
The Nanchang uprising was the first in a series of small confrontations between the 
CCP and the Nationalists in the late 1920s, which though largely unsuccessful, were 
instrumental in shaping the CCP leaders’ perception that the party needed to unify its military 
and political goals.  The Nanchang revolt is significant as the party’s first coordinated 
independent military act.  A close reading of the earliest CCP documents about the uprising 
reveals the immediate recognition of CCP participants that the event was not just a military 
failure, but also a political one, and most importantly, that these two aspects were linked and 
would be equally crucial to the party’s future.  In their earliest assessments of the Nanchang 
uprising, CCP leaders recognized the event’s outcome as a tangible sign of the importance of 
linking their ideological priorities with military objectives. 
The Communist uprising at Nanchang occurred at a time when the Chinese 
Nationalist Party, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, was attempting to consolidate its 
political power throughout China by defeating regional warlords who technically controlled 
portions of the country.  In 1923, just two years after the foundation of the CCP, the Soviet-
led Comintern brokered an agreement between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists 
to cooperate against the warlords.  Though the Soviets sought to eventually assist China in 
transitioning to a socialist regime, preferably under the leadership of the CCP, they supported 
Nationalist efforts to unify China under one political administration, determining it to be a
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key step toward establishing a socialist regime.18 The CCP did not have its own military 
forces prior to events at Nanchang, but some CCP members were in the military and served 
under the Nationalists when they embarked upon the Northern Expedition unification 
campaign in 1926.19  In the meantime, the CCP followed a policy of seizing serendipitous 
opportunities that arose to advance socialist goals by providing aid and political education to 
the Chinese population.20  Prior to 1927, the CCP had not planned to organize a professional 
independent military force, preferring instead to leverage their cooperation in the Northern 
Expedition to increase their exposure to the public and their political power.21 
By spring 1927, successes in the Northern Expedition campaign began to make the 
alliance with the CCP less desirable to some Nationalist leaders, who were growing irritated 
with the CCP’s “opportunist” activities educating people about socialism, cooperating with 
urban trade unions to foment labor protests, and stirring up rural interest in Communist land 
reform policies.  In April 1927, debate over the alliance culminated in the Nationalist party’s 
division into two factions.  The faction led by Chiang Kai-shek not only sought to end 
cooperation with the CCP, but also attempted to eliminate the CCP entirely through a violent 
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18. For a definitive work on the Leninist model of revolution and its application in China that has stood the test 
of time, see Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography 1888-1938 (New 
York: Knopf, 1973), especially 258-261. Bruce Elleman has also recently re-examined the role of the Soviet 
Comintern in 1920s China in Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China, 1925-30: The 
Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army (London: Routledge, 2009), making use of Russian sources, 
but not Chinese sources. 
19 .It bears recognition that individuals’ self-identification with political parties in China at this time was 
somewhat murky, possibly due in equal parts to the parties’ joint influence of the mandate of Sun Yatsen’s 
revolution, the newness of the Chinese republic, and the chaos of the warlord period.  Several of the CCP’s 
most famous early military leaders had been active Guomindang members before committing to the CCP cause 
or in some cases prior to the founding of the CCP in 1921. These individuals often had access to training at the 
Whampoa Military Academy before the Northern Expedition.  For further information on the background of 
early CCP military leaders, see William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist 
Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York: Praeger, 1973). 
20. Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949. (New York: Random House, 
1972), 72. 
21. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 26. 
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attack on Communists in Shanghai.  Chiang’s campaign killed about 300 Communists, 
according to CCP records, and left 5,000 more wounded, missing, or forced into hiding in 
Shanghai and elsewhere in eastern China.22  Following this purge, Chiang set up a 
headquarters for his faction in Nanjing. The other faction initially preserved its alliance with 
the CCP for several months, but by late July 1927, trust between the two parties had eroded 
and the arrangement was falling apart.23   
Chiang Kai-shek’s antagonism of the CCP in April 1927 shocked the Communists not 
only as a threat to CCP survival but also as a betrayal of the spirit of China’s 1911 national 
revolution, which had ended the Qing Dynasty and heralded China’s efforts to establish itself 
as a modern nation-state.  Disappointment in their former allies was instrumental in shifting 
the attitudes of CCP leaders about the use of force. 24  Because they assessed Chiang Kai-
shek to be aligning himself too closely to the wealthy and corrupt figures in Chinese society, 
the CCP leaders came to believe they were justified in beginning to build a party army and 
mobilizing the Chinese masses to rise up against the Nationalists under CCP guidance. In the 
late spring of 1927, they decided to seek opportunities to plan and execute armed 
uprisings.25   
Their first opportunity came in late July 1927, when the military situation around 
Nanchang presented a unique opportunity for the Communists.  Several regiments of the 
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22. Guillermaz, History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949, 124-5. 
23. Jacques Guillermaz, “The Nanchang Uprising,” The China Quarterly 11, no. Jul (1962): 160-168. 
24. Evidence of the attitudes and intentions of CCP leaders in the late 1920s can be found in reports from the ?
???[Zhongyang Tongxin/Central Newsletter], an internal CCP newsletter published in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.  Reports in this publication were written by party members and tended to be eyewitness accounts 
of events or ideological essays.  Some documents from this publication have been compiled and published in 
Chinese in??? : ????? ?  [Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang 
Uprising: Collected Memorials of the Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], Part 1 (1-181). 
25. Guillermaz, “The Nanchang Uprising,” 162. 
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Nationalists’ Second Front Army forces that were under the leadership of CCP members or 
sympathizers as part of the alliance were coincidentally posted in the Nanchang vicinity at 
the same time, facilitating their cooperation in a revolt.  The site itself was also tempting 
because large amounts of arms and ammunition were stored there.  Furthermore, Nanchang 
was strategically located on the way to the southern Chinese province of Guangdong, where 
the CCP initially intended to gather to wait for additional Soviet support if they were 
successful in triggering a broad socialist revolution.  The planned objectives of the Nanchang 
uprising included creating a Communist-led revolutionary committee to serve as a new 
military and political authority, positioning the CCP as a replacement for what the CCP 
assessed to be a counterrevolutionary Nationalist Party, and implementing serious land 
reform in the Nanchang area, which would involve confiscating the land held by the most 
powerful landlords and redistributing it to poor sharecroppers, according to a report from one 
uprising participant.26  CCP leaders involved in the plans also hoped that it would have the 
effect of joining various Communist-led Nationalist army regiments into one force separate 
from the Nationalist Party leadership that would then inspire the residents of Nanchang to 
resist the Nationalists and transfer their allegiance to a Communist administration. 
Based on these ambitious objectives, several CCP members who were serving as 
division leaders in the Nationalist Army on August 1 commanded their regiments to seize 
Nanchang.  At least five divisions of soldiers entered the city, probably around 20,000 to 
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26. ??? ?: ????? ?? [Li Lisan baogao: bayi geming zhi jingguo yu jiaoxun/Li Lisan’s 
report: Lessons and Process of the 8-1 Revolt], ??? : ????? ?  [Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang 
bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang Uprising: Collected Memorials of the Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], 82. 
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30,000 total troops.27  In the initial confusion of the surprise attack, the soldiers subdued the 
limited resistance they met from the Nationalist troops who had been stationed to guard the 
city.  They quickly established a headquarters and a revolutionary committee in the city. 
However, the attack remained a surprise for only a very brief time.28  Nationalist military 
leaders immediately ordered troops still under their control (the majority of them) to reclaim 
the city.  The CCP members had expected to be able to defend their hold on the city with the 
help of Nanchang residents who they believed would rally behind them. Instead, the 
Communists received little help from local residents.29  By August 3, the Nationalist troops 
had forced the Communists to retreat from Nanchang. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered, the 
Communists fled Nanchang into the surrounding countryside, leading a retreat of all the 
troops they could prevent from deserting and carrying all the Nationalist ammunition they 
could acquire.  
Though they were counting on the aid of the Nanchang-area residents, the CCP 
leaders had not allocated the time or resources to adequately engage in any large-scale 
political program in Nanchang.  The Nationalists, in contrast, had spread negative 
propaganda about the Communists throughout the countryside, convincing local people that 
the CCP members were “a Northern Army putting into effect communal wives and 
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27. According to Guillermaz, a “Chinese regiment (tuan) consists generally of three battalions (ying), each 
battalion consisting of three or four companies (lian).  Battalion strength stands probably between 500 and 700 
troops.” Guillermaz, “The Nanchang Uprising,” p. 163, ref6. 
28. In fact, some sources suggest that the leadership of the Second Front Army received advance news of the 
impending revolt at Nanchang on July 31 before it happened. Li Lisan claimed a battalion commander of the 
20th Army, perhaps He Long, leaked details of the CCP plans to Guomindang officers. For further, see Marcia 
R Ristaino, China’s Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928 (Durham, N.C: Duke 
University Press, 1987), 26.  
29. ??? ?: ???? [Zhou Yiqun baogao: Guanyu Nanchang qiyi wenti/Report from Zhou 
Yiqun: Regarding the Problem of the Nanchang Uprising, October 30, 1927], ??? : ????? ?
 [Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang Uprising: Collected Memorials of the 
Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], 120-121.  
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communal property.”30  Therefore, rural residents viewed the CCP troops with considerable 
suspicion and antagonism, probably perceiving them as they would any other dangerous and 
threatening warlord army or violent gang common in this period in China’s history.  Though 
the CCP Revolutionary Committee intended to rely on local support to provide food, water, 
and shelter, as well as assistance in carrying the force’s various heavy munitions, instead they 
encountered resistance and animosity from residents.   
At the same time, poor conditions on the road south led to the attrition of the troops 
rallied under the Communist banner.  Many simply deserted.  Others perished from 
exhaustion from carrying heavy ordnance or from the poor conditions and lack of provisions 
on the road.  CCP member Li Lisan reported that the weather was extremely hot during the 
march and the CCP troops marched 60 to 100 li (20-30 miles) each day, with each carrying 
250-300 rounds of ammunition.31  Soldiers also had to carry heavy artillery on their backs 
and shoulders without help from porters since local peasants refused to assist them.  Food 
and water were not available for troops, so many became ill from consuming contaminated 
supplies.  Once sick, soldiers in the fledgling army seldom received care due to the CCP’s 
lack of medical capabilities or supplies.  Li Lisan reported that “men were constantly 
dropping dead on the road.”32  
Morale among the CCP troops plummeted and many more deserted.  As the situation 
deteriorated, it became more violent in some places, with reports of soldiers shooting 
civilians, which could not have improved the CCP’s image in those areas.33  The combined 
 
30. Li Lisan’s report. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Zhou Yiqun’s report.  
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effects of these conditions had a dramatic impact on the CCP forces. From an initial count of 
as many as 30,000 troops, the CCP forces decreased to about 5,000 troops by the end of the 
Nanchang episode and as few as 1,000 by the time they reached their southern rally point 
later in 1927.34  The attrition caused CCP member Zhou Yiqun to remark in his report that 
“it was stunning to see such huge losses without a battle even having been fought.”35  
Beyond personnel losses, the fact that so much of the ammunition and artillery was 
abandoned put the CCP forces in a weaker position for future engagements.  
The main successful aspect of the operation was that the event was technically the 
first example of a Communist-led military insurgency in China.  The CCP force that fought 
in it therefore represented an embryonic example of what would become the Chinese 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, precursor to the Chinese Communist forces that 
eventually became known as People’s Liberation Army in 1949.  Aside from this important 
achievement, the Nanchang military engagement itself was a failure in almost every way and 
those present described it as such in their reports.  
The earliest accounts from CCP members who participated in the Nanchang revolt, 
circulated internally within the party, reflect their desire to provide detailed analysis of how 
the party’s execution of the revolt failed in order to prevent repeating mistakes.  Participants 
documented their assessments in reports that circulated in the late 1920s among early CCP 
leaders.  The reports concluded that developing military forces under exclusively Communist 
leadership was important, but it was equally important to encourage mass support for the 
party throughout the countryside.  To guarantee support from the broad population, the CCP 
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34. Zhu De, “Zhu De’s Reminiscences of Nanchang Uprising” Xinhua News Agency, July 31, 1982 (excerpted 
and reprinted from Zhu De, “From the Nanchang Uprising to Going Up the Jinggang Mountain,” June 1962. 
Translated and digitally archived by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). 
35. Zhou Yiqun’s report. 
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leaders determined that the party must synchronize military and political plans, ensuring that 
military actions bolstered rather than undermined the party’s image with workers and 
peasants.  In retrospect, it is clear that participants in the uprising reached conclusions that 
were critical to how CCP leaders later conceptualized the integrated relationship between 
party, army, and people.  
Though the Soviet model of revolution had already advocated this close interaction 
between the Communist Party, the people, and armed forces, the Nanchang uprising was the 
first of several similar experiences in the late 1920s that encouraged CCP leaders to develop 
a party-army relationship that they deemed specifically appropriate for the Chinese context in 
its emphasis on protecting and serving the Chinese population.  Implicit within this 
understanding was recognition by those who had fought at Nanchang that the CCP must 
develop strategies to overcome their lack of resources in comparison to their opponents and 
that the CCP could not expect to dominate the Nationalists in a head-on battle.  This 
realization increased the appeal of guerilla tactics and non-traditional approaches to warfare 
for the Communist leaders. In sum, those involved in the Nanchang uprising whose accounts 
have been preserved reported that succeeding in military conflicts against the Nationalists 
would require a close integration between political ideology, mobilization efforts, and 
military strategy, all best achieved under the close scrutiny of the political leadership of the 
party itself.   
Reports on the results of the Nanchang incident and subsequent retreat went into 
considerable detail describing political shortcomings and speculating about the kinds of 
political work that would have been effective. Party leaders drew two important overarching 
conclusions.  First, the CCP had entered a new phase of its history that would require it to 
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develop independent military strength.  Second, to achieve any lasting support and success 
from the public, the CCP’s independent use of military force must be fully integrated with its 
political goals.  The reports of CCP leaders who participated in events at Nanchang appear to 
have had a direct influence on Central Committee Document Number 13, the party’s official 
assessment of CCP action at Nanchang, released on October 12, 1927.36  
Document Number 13 is notable as a turning point in the narrativization of the 
Nanchang uprising because it marks the first example of the party’s use of the Nanchang 
uprising events as part of its developing rhetoric to legitimize the CCP’s use of military force.  
The document declared the revolt at Nanchang to have been a defeat of the CCP, but it also 
announced the beginning of a new phase of “revolutionary armed struggle” that would 
involve workers and peasants.  In the document, the party’s Central Committee also 
acknowledged that the party would need to develop its military, but could not hope to win 
direct engagements with Nationalist opponents. Rather, it recommended that the military 
work with workers and peasants to continue stirring up revolt that would disrupt Nationalist 
control.  The document highlights lessons learned at Nanchang and affirms the party’s 
official commitment to pursing a new kind of people’s war, characterized by a close 
relationship between the CCP and its armed forces; neither could achieve their goals on 
behalf of the Chinese people without the other or without the full assistance and support of 
the people themselves.
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36. This document is widely available in collections of early CCP documents. For the Chinese version, see??
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CHAPTER 4 
JUSTIFYING DOCTRINE THROUGH COMMEMORATION IN 1933 
As the party’s official consensus on the important ideological and strategic lessons 
learned from the Nanchang uprising, the publication of Central Document 13 marked the 
beginning of a period of transformation for the Communists’ strategic behavior, moving 
toward greater integration of political and military goals.  Moreover, CCP leaders in the early 
1930s interpreted changes in their attitude toward the use of force as one key reason their 
party was able to survive repeated Nationalist attacks between 1927 and 1933.37  Thus the 
party’s declaration in 1933 of an official anniversary holiday commemorating the Nanchang 
uprising that became known as Army Day (? , jianjunjie) presents an image of a 
Communist Party that looks back with pride on its success in repelling a series of brutal 
Nationalist attacks on the Communist base in Jiangxi province that they had worked hard to 
establish.  The CCP’s prideful commemoration of the Nanchang uprising in 1933 now 
appears somewhat ironic in light of the brutal Nationalist crackdown on the CCP bases that 
would soon collapse them and drive the Communist leaders on the notorious Long March 
(1934-1935).  However, the official resolutions that record the party’s assessment of the 
Nanchang uprising prior to the Long March are useful because they document a key turning
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37. Many scholars today would argue that if these strategic changes had any effect on CCP success in the early 
1930s, it was probably fairly minor. In fact, some have suggested that the Communist survival was due in part 
to Japan’s invasion of China, which prevented Chiang Kai-shek from applying his full military force to 
destroying the Communist Party between 1927 and 1933. For a concise analysis of the Japanese arrival in China 
and the Nationalist response, see Edward L Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949 (London ;New York: Longman, 
1995), Ch.  5. 
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point in the party’s use of the memory of shared military experiences to shore up support for 
political and military policy.  
It is striking that these first examples of the party’s commemorative narrative about 
the Nanchang uprising omit references to tactical failures, even though several of the original 
published accounts of the event describe the event as a defeat.  Because the Nanchang revolt 
marked the start of a trend toward what the party in 1933 interpreted to be its military success, 
its failure to meet its specific objectives in 1927 was made irrelevant in the collective 
memory of the CCP elite.  Moreover, the party’s ability to achieve its political goals using 
the strategic trends put in motion by the Nanchang revolt validated the party’s intention to 
continue honing its use of force in the same way.  The two main documents the party 
produced to declare the official commemorative holiday—one from the military and the other 
from the party’s broader central committee—reflect this process of self-validation.  
The first commemorative declaration came from the CCP’s Central Revolutionary 
Military Committee (CRMC), a body of military officers responsible for the primary 
decisionmaking on military affairs that included some members who had participated in the 
Nanchang incident.  After the Communists repelled the fourth attack by Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist troops, the CRMC formally recommended to the party’s top leaders that August 1 
be made an official party holiday. 38  The document implies that such a holiday would be 
observed within areas under CCP rule, which at this time would have been rural enclaves the 
party called soviets.  The CRMC’s recommendation came during a brief period of peace and 
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38. “???? ?? ??: ????? ??? ?? ??[Zhongyang Geming Junshi 
Weiyuanhui ming: Guanyu jueding Ba-Yi wei Zhongguo Gongnong Hongjun Chengli Jinianri/Central 
Revolutionary Military Committee Order Regarding the Decision to Make “8-1” the Anniversary of the 
Establishment of the Peasants and Workers Red Army,” June 30, 1933, ??? : ????? ?  
[Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang Uprising: Collected Memorials of the 
Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], 169. 
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optimism that the CCP experienced in the summer of 1933, before the Nationalists launched 
their successful fifth offensive later in the year. 39  The party’s celebration of a Nanchang 
uprising anniversary suggests that in June and July, before the fifth offensive, the 
Communists were celebrating their belief that they had earned the right to govern in their 
small area, and perhaps even to expand their rule.   
The CRMC’s recommendation echoes the emphasis of 1927’s Document 13 on the 
necessity of involving workers and peasants in military struggle to seize political power.  
Specifically, the CRMC directive urges the commemoration of the founding of the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Red Army each on August 1 because on that day, the army began 
“fundamentally shaking the imperialist Guomindang hold on power, became a kind of 
turning point for the revolution, became organizers of the revolutionary war of the proletariat, 
and thoroughly advanced the main force of the people’s revolution.”40  No mention is made 
of the details of the Nanchang attack, including the specific outcomes of the confrontation or 
the admission of failure by those involved. 
Similarly, the Central Committee’s response to the CRMC proposal, formally 
establishing the 8-1 holiday, makes only brief and politically-charged references to the 
specific events at Nanchang. 41  This document was released by the party’s Central 
Committee, whose members collectively exerted the highest level of political power and 
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39. For comprehensive descriptions of the third and fourth Nationalist encirclement campaigns, see William 
Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 272-278.  
40. “Central Revolutionary Military Committee Order.”  
41. “???? ??? ?? ?? [Zhongyang Zhengfu Guanyu Ba-Yi Jinian Yundong.de Jueyi/Central 
Government Resolution Concerning 8-1 Anniversary Campaign,” July 1, 1933, ??? : ????? ?
 [Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang Uprising: Collected Memorials of the 
Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], 170. This document was originally published in the CCP’s Red China newspaper, 
which had a print run of about 40,000 copies, according to Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist 
Party, 1921-1949, 215. 
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oversaw the CRMC. The Central Committee references the Nanchang revolt itself only as the 
instance when the party joined with the workers and peasants to fight back against the 
imperialist threat that the Nationalist Party had started to present.  According to the document, 
it is this spirit of cooperation between party, workers and peasants in offensive military acts 
that gives rise to the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. The remainder of the 
document approves the establishment of Army Day on August 1, as well as creating formal 
institutional structures to provide for the dependents of soldiers.  It is unlikely that these 
soldiers or their dependents were able to enjoy tangible benefits from this provision for very 
long, however, because the fifth Nationalist attack launched in November 1933 destroyed the 
Jiangxi Soviet in early 1934, causing the surviving CCP members to flee to the southwest on 
the Long March. 
Given the cult of personality that later arose around Mao Zedong and credit he 
received for military theories he wrote about later in the 1930s, it is striking that none of the 
party documents referenced so far in this paper about the origins of the CCP military forces 
and the earliest need for integrated party-army leadership refer specifically to Mao.42  He 
was not present at the Nanchang uprising itself, though he was involved in later uprisings that 
occurred in fall 1927.  The omission of references to Mao and other leaders in the early 
Nanchang revolt commemoration reflects the degree to which events at Nanchang, and the 
lessons the party subsequently drew from those events in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
were a result of collective decisionmaking, following the basic principles of democratic 
centralism from the Marxist-Leninist model.  The collective nature of the party’s earliest 
published official records on the significance of the Nanchang uprising also underscores that 
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42. Mao’s strategic writings are widely available in Chinese or in English translation. For example, see Selected 
Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). 
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by 1933, the CCP leadership had reached consensus on the party’s legitimate need to use 
military force alongside and as an extension of political goals. Though Mao would later 
elaborate on this theme in his famous military writings, he is not responsible for the original 
idea. 
The CCP’s published documentary records include few narratives of early party 
military history, including that of the Nanchang narrative, between 1934 and 1944.  Because 
the Army Day holiday is still an important state ritual in the PRC, CCP historians over the 
years have compiled comprehensive anthologies of party documents and memoir excerpts 
relevant to the Nanchang uprising; the dates of included materials jump without explanation 
from the 1933 documents declaring the Army Day commemorative holiday to documents 
from 1944 that will be analyzed below.  While the absence of evidence cannot be invoked to 
denote a historical trend with any real confidence, this lacuna in party documents glorifying 
the establishment of the CCP army could indicate that the release of many of Mao’s most 
important writings on strategy eclipsed party interest in the Nanchang uprising.  The CCP 
may also have felt less pressure to emphasize its legitimate right to use force in the 
immediate aftermath of the Long March and during China’s war with Japan, when it 
maintained a nominal alliance with the Nationalists.  An equally plausible and not mutually 
exclusive explanation is that during this decade of great hardship and warfare, the CCP was 
simply not producing the same volume of documents or that the documents were not as 
effectively preserved.  The status of Army Day activities in the 1934-1944 period is a subject 
that deserves further research in unpublished party documents. 
 Despite the gaps noted above, the party records that have been preserved 
demonstrate that the CCP’s experiences in the period between 1933 and 1944 reinforced 
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lessons CCP leaders had drawn from their earliest assessments of the Nanchang uprising.  In 
particular, the party continued to stress the seamless integration of political and military goals 
with the priorities of the Chinese people, and they identified this relationship as their primary 
justification for action.  When they were successful, and even when success was defined 
simply as survival, triumph was credited to the kind of cooperation between political and 
military elements to liberate the people emphasized in the party’s version of the Nanchang 
uprising story.  When they were less successful, on the other hand, the themes ensconced in 
the commemorative narrative legitimized their continued fight.  With these values embedded 
in the Army Day narratives and reinforced through repetition and commemoration, party 
leaders internalized them as core values that enabled them to survive hard times.  By the time 
competition with the Nationalists intensified in the mid-1940s, requiring the CCP to mobilize 
public support on a mass scale, the Communist leaders relied on the Nanchang uprising story 
to invoke a collective memory of a past event that they believed validated their claim to 
represent the Chinese people by fighting with them and for them.

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CHAPTER 5 
ESTABLISHING “8-1” AS A SYMBOL OF PARTY-ARMY RELATIONS 
In the history of the party’s reliance on the Nanchang uprising to symbolize party-
army relations, the first noteworthy development was the official declaration in 1933 of the 
Army Day holiday to commemorate the importance of the uprising; the next significant 
turning point came in the mid-1940s as the Communists sought to recruit support and absorb 
new members.  At this point, CCP leaders began to slightly de-emphasize the association of 
the Nanchang revolt with the beginning of the “anti-imperialist revolution” and the 
development of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasant’s Red Army, the dominant themes of the 
narratives about Nanchang events in circulation until the 1940s.  Instead, they became 
interested in fostering within the broadest portion of the population an image of the CCP’s 
army as a professional military force capable of defending both the CCP ideals and the 
Chinese nation-state; references to the Nanchang uprising shifted accordingly.  
As civil war in China began to seem more likely, CCP leaders based at Yan’an 
focused intently on transforming their ideological goals into administrative practices, 
building an increasingly professionalized modern military, and on mobilizing broad public 
support.  As the party absorbed a dramatic increase in new members, narratives of its 
foundation and early history assumed a new role for legitimizing the party’s political 
identityand its claim on political authority in China. In conjunction with party rectification 
efforts that took place in the 1940s, CCP leaders devoted considerable attention at this time 
to producing and reproducing narratives of the party’s early history and shared experiences
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from the previous two decades, including the Nanchang uprising.  CCP leaders turned with 
renewed interest to the task of writing the party’s official history.  
It is at this time that the details of the Nanchang revolt itself become much less 
essential to the CCP’s narrative than in the earliest versions.  For party leaders who had been 
commemorating the Nanchang uprising for about a decade based on the 1933 narrative, 
references to the Nanchang uprising had become synonymous with the themes of party-army 
cooperation and the CCP’s military culture, which they had internalized as a key 
characteristic of the CCP’s identity. In other words, as a result of the party’s retelling of the 
Nanchang uprising events and its process of commemoration between 1927 and 1944, even 
brief references to the uprising had assumed the ability to convey layers of meaning about 
party-army relations and the CCP’s responsibilities to the Chinese people.  Thus, while 
formalizing the first versions of the party’s official history at their base in Yan’an, the CCP 
leaders subtly converted the collective memory of the Nanchang uprising into a shorthand 
cultural reference to the origin and justification of the Communist armed forces.  
This process is recognizable in the party’s documentary record. In 1944, party leaders 
held a symposium where they determined how the official history of their army would be 
written, according the memoirs of Zhu De, a famous Chinese military leader who was present 
at the symposium.43  As Zhu recalls party political and military leaders present at the 
symposium recounted the details of the Nanchang uprising as they had been preserved in 
Document 13 in 1927 and in the 1933 commemoration announcements as well as how they 
were preserved in the personal memories of those cadre who had participated in the revolt. 
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43. ??: ? ? ? ?? ??? ? ( )  [Zhu De: Zai bianxie hongjun yijuntuan shi 
zuotanhui shang de jinhua (jielu)/The Evolution of the first symposium on writing Red Army history (excerpt), 
1944] in??? : ????? ?  [Nanchang qiyi: Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang 
Uprising: Collected Memorials of the Nanchang “8-1” Uprising], 176-179. 
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They recorded the Nanchang uprising as the first example of the CCP’s momentous decision 
to use military force to achieve its objective, which was to defeat the Nationalists and the 
imperialist forces it represented.   
As party members gathered in meetings for the Seventh CCP Party Congress, the 
consensus on the Red Army’s history that Zhu De and other leaders had reached in 1944 also 
made its way in a distilled form into the party’s famous “Resolution of the CCP Central 
Committee on Certain Historical Questions” (April 20, 1945), which was a crucial document 
produced at the Seventh Party Congress, setting out the CCP’s main party line on its history, 
from which it derived its political and military legitimacy, as argued by Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik and Wemheuer and referenced earlier in this essay.44  The focus of this 
document is political ideology, so specific references to events, even those as important as 
the Nanchang uprising, is rare.  Nonetheless, references to the same ideological 
characteristics found in the party’s Nanchang uprising narrative since its first use are evident, 
even when associated with and attributed to Mao Zedong. For example, the following quote: 
Comrade Mao Zedong’s military line proceeds from two fundamental points. First 
our army is and can be an army of only one kind; it must be an instrument 
subordinate to the ideological leadership of the proletariat and serving the struggle of 
the people and the building of revolutionary base areas. Second, our war is and can 
be a war of only one kind; it must be a war in which we recognize that the enemy is 
strong and we are weak, that the enemy is big and we are small, and in which 
therefore we fully utilize the enemy’s weaknesses and our strong points and fully 
rely on the strength of the masses for survival, victory, and expansion.45 
Within this prose lies a core idea party leaders had internalized since the original Nanchang 
uprising narrative was drafted: the CCP’s army was a cooperative political and military effort 
and such an approach would enable it to defeat stronger opponents. 
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44. The complete text of this document is available in Chinese on the CCP’s official website.  See “ ????
????? ? ??  [Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti.de jueyi] (via 
cpc.people.com.cn),” cpc.people.com.cn, accessed November 30, 2010, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65374/4526455.html.  For a complete English translation, see 
Tony Saich, ed. The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, 1164-1179. 
45. Saich, ed. The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, 1173-1174. 
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By the time the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, the official CCP narrative 
about the Nanchang uprising and the origin of the CCP army took on a form only slightly 
different from the version that exists on the website of China’s state-run news service today.  
Mirroring the 1933 documents, the narrative matched the triumphant and patriotic tone of the 
annual Army Day celebration.  It minimized or omitted references to negative outcomes of 
the uprising, even if factual, that could cast a shadow over the image of the founding of the 
party’s army, with which the party’s leaders supposedly cooperated so closely.  When the 
PLA was formally established in early 1949 before the founding of the PRC itself, the party 
designed its logo and flag to include the Chinese characters??( “8-1,” designating August 
1) in reference to its origin at the 1927 Nanchang revolt. 
The shift in the late 1940s in which the party’s collective memory of the Nanchang 
uprising was transformed into a meaning-laden metonym for the historic origins of the 
party’s armed forces can be seen in two further examples.  First, a rhetorical shift occurred. 
The term used to describe the CCP’s actions at Nanchang has changed over time, reflecting 
the evolution of the memory of the event within party historiography.  By 1949, the CCP 
began referring officially to the events at Nanchang using the term “uprising” (qiyi ? ), 
which in Chinese usually has connotations of a heroic and just collective action taken in self 
defense.  Historian Martin C. Wilbur first noticed in the 1960s that this term was not 
regularly applied in party documents prior to 1949.46  Publication since then of many 
additional accounts of the August 1 incident in the original Chinese bears out Wilbur’s 
findings.   
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46. Wilbur, “Ashes of Defeat,” 6.  For an example of current CCP history of the Nanchang uprising, see article 
in the CCP history section of the web portal of China’s state-run news service, Xinhua: “????? ???
? [Ba yi nanchang qiyi zhi “ba yi” Jian Jun Jie”/“The 8-1 Nanchang Uprising and the 8-1 Army Day 
holiday”], Xinhua News Service, www.xinhuanet.com, accessed on October 15, 2010. 
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Most descriptions of events at Nanchang up until the establishment of the People’s 
Republic refer to the situation as a “revolt” or “insurrection” (baodong ? ), which simply 
implies a minority group taking violent action against an authority.  Some authors, such as 
CCP members Li Lisan and Zhou Yiqun, who wrote after-action reports about the Nanchang 
uprising referenced earlier in this essay, often refer to the situation simply as an “incident” 
(shijian ??) or even as a defeat (shibai? ). At other times they and others use the term 
“revolution” (geming ??), which emphasizes both the fact that the incident was a revolt, 
but also that it set in motion a period of armed Communist revolution. In these cases, they 
generally do not refer to a “Nanchang Revolution,” but rather a “Workers and Peasants 
Revolution.” Central Document Number 13, representing the consensus of the party on 
Nanchang events at the time, uses the term “revolt” (baodong? ) as does the official 
declaration of the Army Day holiday in 1933. Not until the 1950s, after the Communists have 
taken power in China, does the party regularly use the term uprising.47  
Standardizing the use of the term “uprising” after the 1950s probably reflects the 
interest of CCP leaders to use the memory of the party’s experience at Nanchang as a 
tangible reminder of its success at achieving a symbiosis between political and military goals. 
Capitalizing on this shared history in a symbolic way would have been particularly important 
in the first years of the People’s Republic, as China recovered from a prolonged period of 
war and the party’s leaders struggled to unify the country under one civilian Communist 
regime.  Encouraging the preservation and commemoration of the special relationship 
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47. For example, see “?:???? ?? ?<<??? >> ?? 1957  [Zhou Enlai deng qin deng qinbi 
canguande “bayi qiyi” shuominggao” /“Zhou Enlai on an Autograph Tour for the “Nanchang Uprising” 
exhibit”] article, 1957 (month and day unclear), in in??? : ????? ?  [Nanchang qiyi: 
Nanchang bayi qiyi jinianguan bian /Nanchang Uprising: Collected Memorials of the Nanchang “8-1” 
Uprising], 181. 
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between party and military would have helped justify the continued need for a party army, 
instead of an army directly controlled by a non-partisan state apparatus as exists in many 
countries.  It also would have served to help integrate large numbers of demobilized soldiers 
into a civilian society. 
A second example of the party’s use of condensed and symbolic references to the 
Nanchang uprising narrative in the late 1940s is the main article commemorating the “8-1” 
Army Day that ran in the party’s top newspaper on August 1, 1949.  The article contains 
about 1,200 words, but only two sentences focus specifically on the Nanchang uprising event 
itself; they emphasize the important role of the Nanchang uprising as the civil war’s first 
stage and the founding event of the army.48  Rather than recalling the details of the uprising 
being commemorated, the rest of the document recounts the valor of the PLA throughout the 
two civil wars (1927-1937 and 1945-1949) and the war against Japan.   
This example is important not just for documenting the transition the party had made 
in the content of the narrative about the Nanchang uprising it was disseminating, but also for 
the audience at which it was directing this message.  By 1949, the Army Day 
commemoration was not an activity primarily designed to encourage esprit d’corps or to 
clarify the party’s ideological basis for the use of force for other party members.  Instead, this 
commemorative narrative was aimed at the broadest possible audience and designed to 
justify the party’s use of force to the Chinese public, the new citizens of the PRC.  This is the 
purpose that the Nanchang uprising narrative has largely served for the party since 1949.  In 
particular, the collective memory party leaders invoked with references to the Nanchang 
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48. Ma Xulun, “ ? ? 8-1 ? [Jinian weida “8-1” jianjunjie /Commemorating the Great “August 1st 
Army Day],” The People’s Daily, August 1, 1949. 
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uprising, or simply “8-1,” became an important tool for legitimizing civil-military relations in 
the early PRC. 
Between 1950 and 1953, when the PLA was assisting North Korean troops in 
repelling the invasion of American and South Korean forces, the CCP’s activities 
commemorating Army Day reflect the extent to which party leaders had internalized the 
concepts their narratives highlighted.  The PLA’s intervention in Korea was a demonstration 
on a massive scale of what party leaders thought they could accomplish through close 
ideological management of their army and its demonstrated ability to defeat strong opponents 
through superior tactics.  In 1950, less than a year after the establishment of the PRC, 
references to “8-1 Army Day” helped the leaders mobilize their army and homefront to their 
next great anti-imperialist war.  
Articles written in honor of Army Day during the Korean War period (1950-1953) 
also document the developing cult of personality around Mao Zedong’s leadership.  A 
commemorative article published in the party’s main newspaper August 2, 1952 shows the 
degree to which Mao had become associated with the ideological legitimacy of strategic 
decisionmaking.  The article, written by He Long, a CCP leader who had participated in the 
Nanchang uprising, briefly references the Nanchang events as “the birth of the Chinese 
People’s Army” and “the first time the Chinese people, under the leadership of the CCP, 
independently took up arms and organized the people’s armed forces.”49  The remaining five 
paragraphs of text serve to credit Mao for establishing the strategic guidance that enabled the 
PLA to achieve victory in all of its conflicts. 
 
49. He Long, “ ? ? 8-1??? ? [Jinian “8-1” Nanchang Qiyi Jianjunjie /Commemorating the “8-
1” Nanchang Uprising Army Day],” People’s Daily, August 2, 1952. 
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He Long’s article is helpful as an example of how the CCP has used the Nanchang uprising 
narrative since the establishment of the PRC as a complex rhetorical device, metonymically 
conveying a version of collective memory about the party’s military history that the CCP 
negotiated over time.  Very few Army Day narratives go into detail about the Nanchang 
uprising itself, but references to the story symbolize the party’s willingness to take up arms 
against forces CCP leaders identified as harmful to Chinese people.  In this narrative, under 
the party’s close supervision, the PLA can accomplish amazing military feats because it is 
fighting on behalf of the Chinese people.  Beyond these basic symbolic messages, the story is 
flexible.  New aspects of the CCP’s military history can be added to it as the party reaches 
consensus upon them.  In the Nanchang uprising narrative, the CCP leaders found a 
malleable story valuable for verifying their party’s right to bear arms, for their civilian 
constituents as much as in their own minds. 
 


CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
The evolution of the CCP’s Nanchang uprising narrative had a profound effect on 
how CCP leaders conceived their own right to bear arms and how they communicated these 
ideas to the Chinese public before and after the establishment of the PRC.  As party leaders 
developed their strategic ideology in the 1930s, the process itself of refining and reproducing 
the Nanchang uprising narrative encouraged CCP leaders to stress a collaborative and 
integrated relationship between CCP political leaders, the military, and the Chinese people as 
a pillar of their party’s strength and a persistent source of political legitimacy.  When the 
CCP succeeded in surviving the first few years of Nationalist attacks, the leaders chose to 
interpret their success as validation of their strategy, further legitimizing the themes of their 
Nanchang uprising narrative. Later, when the CCP in the late 1940s began to broadcast its 
ideology to the widest possible part of the Chinese population, the collective memory of the 
Nanchang revolt that Communist leaders had established in their early narratives, and its 
incumbent layers of meaning, became metonymic for the themes of party-army cooperation 
imbedded within those narratives.  In other words, a simple reference to the date “8-1” 
simultaneously carried with it symbolic reference to the founding event of the PLA and the 
party’s integrated relationship between itself, its military, and the people, which was crucial 
to the party’s ultimate success in leading revolution.  
The process of commemorating the Nanchang uprising both influenced and was 
influenced by how CCP leaders defined their relationship to the use of military force, setting 


the tone for militarized political rhetoric that came to characterize the state-society 
relationship in the PRC.  Commemoration of the Nanchang uprising has been one of the most 
visible ways that the CCP leadership invokes shared experiences of revolutionary warfare in 
order to define the role of the military in the PRC.  Thus, understanding the process by which 
the Nanchang uprising became a symbol of the CCP’s emphasis on integrating political and 
military ideology illuminates how and why the party’s political legitimacy became so closely 
linked to its military practices and strategic ideologies in the early PRC—valuable context 
for explaining the militarized tone of the party’s leadership of the PRC in the Mao era and 
beyond. 
Because narrativization of the Nanchang uprising was an integral part of the political 
process by which the CCP developed its militarized institutional culture, this study suggests 
that not only was the emphasis on integration of party, army and society deeply rooted in the 
CCP’s ideological rhetoric by 1949, but the CCP leaders had internalized their own rhetoric 
as an explanation for their party’s survival and success, a factor that distinguished them from 
other political actors, and a reason for their acquisition of support from the Chinese people.  
Therefore, transforming or eliminating the rhetoric derived from the Nanchang uprising 
narrative or moving to a system with more clearly defined political, military, and social 
realms was equated with a critical risk to the party’s legitimate authority and right to govern.  
This conclusion raises new questions that deserve future research about the implications of 
the party’s early military experiences on its state-building efforts when it inherited the 
apparatus of state power in China in 1949. 
Furthermore, this study suggests that, in general, the CCP’s use of narrative as an 
integral part of its political process has been undervalued by recent scholarship.  The 


introduction of new methodologies and theoretical orientations influenced by cultural studies 
into historical scholarship has made it possible for scholars to read new insights from the 
CCP’s most public declarations regarding the development of the party’s own ideology and 
institutional culture as well as the dynamic process by which China’s Communist leaders 
established their legitimacy in the twentieth century.  Rather than dismissing such party 
documents as mere propaganda, scholars may find that further analysis of CCP narratives can 
provide a meaningful contribution to the ongoing debate over the CCP’s rise to power. 

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